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When we look at the issue of core obligations of states with regard to socio-
economic fights, we need to push to the centre of the debate the concern that 
certain fundamental human needs should be non-negotiable. 1 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The drafters of the Constitution clearly envisaged a far-reaching role for it 
in the transformation of post-apartheid society.' Among the key aims of 
the Constitution is to "improve the quality of life of all citizens and free 
the potential of each person".4 This constitutional concern with the socio-
economic well being of people is especially evident in the entrenchment 
of a wide range of justiciable socio-economic rights in the Bill of Rights." 
If the socio-economic rights in the Constitution are to amount to more 
than paper promises, they must serve as useful tools in enabling people to 
gain access to the basic social services and resources needed to live a life 
consistent with human dignity. This paper focuses on the role of the 
courts in promoting the realisation of socio-economic rights in South 
Africa. 
t Although the final product is my own, I would like to acknowledge and thank the 
following people for valuable comments and discussions, which assisled in the devel-
opment of this article: Wim Trengove, David Bilchitz. Julia Sloth-Nielsen, Theunis Roux 
and Danie Brand. Thank you also to the anonymous referees who provided useful 
comments. 
2 Prof. Viviene Taylor. Programme Coordinator (Development). UN Commission on 
Human Security, New York in her closing address to the colloquium organised by the 
Community Law Centre. Realising socio-economic rights in SA: Progress and challenges, 
Cape Town. 17-19 March 2002. 
3 All to 'the Constitution' in this article are to South Africa's final Constitution, Act No. 
108 of 1996. 
4 Ibid Preamble. 
S The relevant socio-economic rights provisions are discussed in 2.2 below. S 38 confers 
standing on a broad range of individuals and groups "to approach a competent court, 
alleging that a right in the Bill of Rights has been infringed or threatened. and the court 
may grant appropriate relief, including a declaration of rights". The Constitutional Coun 










































LAW, DEMOCRACY &. DEVELOPMENT 
The inclusion of socio-economic rights as justiciable rights indicates that 
the Constitution envisages an important role for the judiciary in their 
enforcement. The jurisprudence will define the nature of the state's obli-
gations in relation to socio-economic rights, [he conditions under which 
these rights can be claimed, and the nature of the relief that [hose who 
turn to the courts can expect. The evolving jurisprudence is not only 
significant for future litigation aimed at enforcing socio-economic rights,' 
but also in guiding the adoption and implementation of policies and 
legislation by government to facilitate access to them. It is also important 
to the monitoring and advocacy initiatives by civil society, the South 
African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) and the Commission for 
Gender Equality. / 
The strategic importance of socio-economic rights as tools in anti-
poverty initiatives will diminish if the courts interpret them as imposing 
weak obligations on government and fail to protect them as vigorously as 
they do the other rights in the Bill of Rights.' This paper's departure point 
is that socio-economic rights were included as justiciable rights in the Bill 
of Rights primarily to assist the poor to protect and advance their funda-
mental socio-economic needs and interests, These rights should therefore 
be interpreted in a way that promotes this purpose, 
The paper commences with the background to the inclusion of socio-
economic rights in the Constitution. Thereafter the Constitutional Court's 
evolving jurisprudence on socio-economic rights is reviewed through the 
three leading cases on these rights: Soobramoney." Grootboom,'o and 
Minister oj Health v rAC" In the latter two cases, the decisions of the trial 
courts are also discussed to highlight different interpretative approaches, 
6 To achic:ve optimal efleu, lirigalion should be siratr:g.cally 10,'at,,<1 withlll a broader 
campaign of social mobilisation arollnd socio-eco!loll1ic riglHs. The strategic use of 50-
cio-economic rights litigation by the Trea!rrwnl Aclion CampIIl!JIl (herealler 'the TAC) is 
an important case study in this r"gard. See Heywood 200 I. Also see Pie terse &. Van 
i)ollk in this volulTle. 
7 The papers in this speCIal edition iliustrillC how lile jurisprudence 01 the courts on 50cio-
e;collomic rights can be Ilsed to assess progre;ss by Ihe SliltC in realising various socio-
eCOflOlllic rigills and 10 iciennfy key obslacles experi,'nced by disadvdmaged cOl1lnluni-
ties in accessing them. The SAHHC lias been givell an cxpress constitutional rnandate in 
s 184(3) or the Cunstitution to request inlonnation on an allfillill basis from relevant or-
gans 01 state on llie measures tilat tiley have' taken towards realising the various socio-
economic righls in the lIill of Rigilts. It also lidS tlie power (0 rece;ive; and ,leal with 
complaints of human righlS violatlo!ls. to conduct invesligations. ilnd to report and 
make recolllJnendations [0 governmerll on IiUllIiHl rigllls: see 5 184 of tile Constitution 
and the; IlulDiln Rights Commission Act 54 or 1994, 
8 As expn:ssed by Karl Klare, "adjudicatio!] uniquely reveals ways in Wllich law-making 
and, by extension, legal practices generally. arc and/or could be a medium for accolTl-
plishing jus I ice". Kia re 1 (198: 147. 
9 Soolimmoney v l\.1inisler oj Health. KwaZllill-Natal 1998 1 SA 765 (CC), 1997 (12) BCl,R 
16'16 (Cc) (hereafter Soo/)ramoneyl. 
10 Government of Ihe Replllilic oj SOlllh Africa and Others v Groo//Joom (md Others 200 I I SA 
46 « C), 200() ( 1 I) I3CU, I 169 (CC) (ilereafter Groollioom) 
I 1 Minister of Health and Others v Trealmenl Action Campai!ln and (Jlhers 2002 5 SA 72 I 
(CC), 2002 (10) BCLR 103'3 (CC) (hereafter the TAe case) These three cases deal primarily 










































SOUTH AFRICA'S EVOLVING JURISPRUDENCE ON SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS 
In each case, the Court's jurisprudence is evaluated to determine to what 
extent it supports the struggle of ordinary individuals and civil society 
organisations against poverty. The paper also seeks to identify key areas 
where the jurisprudence can be developed to make it more responsive to 
the needs of the poor. 
Although standing to litigate and effective remedies are clearly crucial to 
the successful use of the courts by the poor, they are not discussed in this 
paper, its main purpose being to evaluate the substantive jurisprudence of 
the Constitutional Court on socio-economic rights. 
2 INCLUDING SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN THE 
CONSTITUTION 
2.1 Background 
One of the major issues of debate around the drafting of the 1996 Consti-
tution was whether socio-economic rights should be included in the Bill of 
Rights as justiciable rights.,3 A coalition of civil society organisations, 
including human rights and development NGOs, church groups, civics and 
trade unions campaigned vigorously for the full inclusion of socio-
economic rights in the Bill of Rights. They argued that the struggle against 
apartheid was as much about access to socio-economic rights, such as the 
right to land, housing, education and health care, as it was about the right 
to vote and other civil liberties. 
---~"---
I 2 The leading case on public interest standing is the Supreme Court of Appeal decision in 
Permanent Secre(ary. Department oj Weifare. Eastern Cape Provincial Government and An-
other v Ngxuza and Others 200 I (10) BCLR 1039 (SCA). On the remedial approach of 
the Constitutional Court in the Grootboom and rAC cases. see Kameshni Pillay in this 
volume 
13 There was a vigorous academic debate on the inclUSion of socio-economic rights in the 
Bill of Rights The parameters of the debate were articulated in a well-known set of arti-
cles published in the 1992 8 SAJHR. Nicholas Haysom argued for the entrenchment of a 
minimum Floor of socio-economic rights "that are necessary for survival at a minimum 
level of human dignity" He argued that by constitutionalising selected socio-economic 
rights. "society is elevaling certain rights to a necessary condition for the existence of a 
minimum civic equality" This in turn would enrich democratiC participation and the ef-
fective use of civil and political rights (Haysom 1992: 461) Dennis Davis argued that 
socio-economic rights should only be included in the Constitution as directive principles 
where they can be used as "interpretative guides as well as basic principles of adminis-
trative review", He argued that the inclUSion of a battery of specific social and economic 
rights would place too much power in the hands of the judiciary. which is not as ac-
countable to the population as is the legislature or executive (Davis 1992: 487. 489). 
Etienne Mureinik argued for the inclusion of socio-economic rights as justiCiable rights 
in the Bill of Rights of a new South African Constitution. However. the role of the courts 
would be confined to judicial review of the justifiability of relevant policy and legislation 
and would not be to order the provision of specific services or resources to any individ-
ual or group. Only "dishonest or irrational means" chosen by the lawmakers or admin-
istrators to realise socio-economic rights would be set aside (Mureinik 1992: 471.474). 
Few academic commentators argued ror the complete exclUSion of socio-economic 










































LAW. DEMOCRACY cSt DEVELOPMENT 
They articulated a two-fold justification for including justiciable socio-
economic rights in the Bill of Rights. Firstly, they argued that socio-eco-
nomic rights would give disadvantaged communities tools to protect and 
advance their interests in the courts. Secondly, they would assist the new 
democratic government to give effect to its reconstruction and develop-
ment programme by, for example, mandating redistributive social pro-
grammes, thereby shielding them from being struck down on the basis of 
vested property rights. ,. 
The argument for full inclusion won the day in the Constitutional As-
sembly. International law, particularly the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966 (hereafter. the ICESCR). and 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child. 1989, were highly influential in 
the drafting of the relevant provisions. " 
However, the inclusion of economic and social rights in the Bill of 
Rights was not uncontested. At the time of the certification of the final 
Constitution, certain groups in civil society objected to the inclusion of 
socio-economic rights in the Bill of Rights. They argued that socio-econo-
mic rights were inconsistent with the separation of powers doctrine be-
cause they would require the judiciary to encroach upon the terrain of the 
legislature and executive in policy and budgetary matters. They further-
more argued that the ri~hts were not justiciable because of their extensive 
budgetary implications. ' 
The Constitutional Court overruled these objections in its first certifica-
tion judgment. ' ! It indicated that it would not endorse a rigid, formalistic 
interpretation of the doctrine of separiltion of powers that would preclude 
the courts from making orders with social policy or budgetary implica-
tions. The Court also signalled that. as a minimum, it would be prepared 
to enforce the negative duty on the state to refrain from interfering in 
people's access ro socio-economic rights.' 
2.2 Normative structure 
The economic and social rights included in the Somh African Constitution 
follow three main drafting styles. The First category entrenches a set of 
14 See tlw petitioll to tile COllstillHioflal AssemlJly hy the Ad Hoc C:olllluitlee for the 
Campaign lor Social and Econoillic KigIHS. July 19'V). reproliuccd ill Pillay and Lieben-
berg 2000: 19 (full pelition on file wilh ilwhor). 
15 OIl Ihe drailing history of Ihe provisiolls and Ihe ini'luence 01 international l<lw. see 
Liebenberg 1991:1: 41. 3 1. Although SOllth Africa signed tile ICESCH on '3 OClob,;r 2002, 
it was nOI ratifieci as al the d,lIe of wriling Nonerlwless Ihe Covl'lIam is relevant 10 the 
lllierprelation 01 Ihe socio-ecoIlolllic ill the (\ill 01 Rights: see s 39 (I )(a) and S" 
Makwanyanp 1995'3 SA '391 (CC), par 
16 Tile objectors were Ihe South Africdfl InstitutE' of Hace Hel<lliolls. the Free Market 
FOlJfldaliol1 ami the Galileng Association of Chambers or COIl11l1erCe and Industry. Or-
gallisal ions t hill made submiSSions supporting lite inclUSion 01 socio-econolllic rights 
were lite I.egal Resources Cenlre. the (entre for Applied Legal Siudies and rhe Commu-
nity Law (emfe ,University of Ihe Western Cape). 
17 Ex Chairpason oj the ConstitlitionalAssf'mvly In rf' Ccrtf/recHion of {he Repuvlic of 
Africu. 1996, 1990 4 SA 74,1 (CC) al pars 7(, 71:1. 
18 ··At lite very 111il1ilf1l1ll1. socio-econontic righls can be I1cgatively protected frolll im-










































SOUTH AFRICA'S EVOLVING JURISPRUDENCE ON SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS 
'basic' rights consisting of children's socio-economic rights.
,q 
the right of 
everyone to basic education, including adult basic education.?O and the 
socio-economic rights of detained persons. including sentenced prison-
ers.21 These rights are not qualified by reference to reasonable measures. 
progressive realisation or resource constraints. The second category of 
rights entrenches the right of "everyone" to "have access to" adequate 
housing, health care services, includinc~ reproductive health care, sufficient 
food and water. and social security:" A second subsection requires the 
state to "take reasonable legislative and other measures. within its avail-
able resources. to achieve the progreSSive realisation of each of these 
rights". This second category can be loosely described as the "qualified" 
socio-economic rights. The third category is located in sections 26(3) and 
27(3). The former provides that "no one" may be evicted from their home 
or have their home demolished, without an order of court made after 
considering all the "relevant circumstances". The latter states that "no one 
may be refused emergency medical treatment". These provisions are 
phrased in the passive tense with no duty holder specified. Like all the 
other rights in the Bill of Rights, the socio-economic rights are subject to 
the general limitations clause, section 36. 
The Constitution places an overarching obligation on the state to "re-
spect. protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights". 24 This 
section establishes that the rights in the Bill of Rights impose a combina-
tion of negative and positive duties on the state. 25 Thus the duty to respect 
reqUires the state to refrain from law or conduct that would interfere in 
people's access to the rights. The duty to protect places a duty on the state 
to take legislative and other measures to protect vulnerable groups against 
19 S 28(1 j(e) gives every ehild the right to "'basic nutrition, shelter. basic health care 
services and social services". A child is defined in s 28(3) as a person under the age of 
J 8 years. 
20 5 29( 1 Ha) 
21 S 35(2)(e) confers the right "to conditIons of detention that are consistent with human 
dignity. including at least exercise and the provision. at state expense. of adequate ac· 
commodation. nutrition. reading material and medical treatment". 
22 Ss26(I)and27(1). 
23 Ss 26(2) and 27(2). The drafting of this provision was clearly influenced by article 2( I) 
of the ICESCR. which describes the nature of states parties' obligations in relation to the 
rights recognised in the Covenant. The sections protecting environmental and land 
rights (ss 24 and 25(5)-(9» use similar phrases to those contained in S5 26 and 27. al· 
though there are important differences in the way they are formulated. See. for exam-
ple. the paper by Lahiff and Rugege in this volume. 
24 S 7(2) This typology is based on the analysis by Henry Shue. 1980. of the obligations 
imposed on states by human rights. It is also used by the UN Committee on Economic. 
Social and Cuhural Rights (CESCR) to analyse the duties imposed by various rights in the 
ICESCR: see. eg General Comment No 12 (Twentieth session 1999). The right to ade-
quate jood (art 11 oj the Covenant) UN doc. EI2000122, par 15; and General Comment 
No. 14 (Twenty-second session. 2000) The right to the highest attainable standard oj 
health (art 12 oj the Covenant) UN doc. EIC. I 21200014. pars 33-37 
25 As Justice Kriegler has observed: "We do not operate under a constilution in which the 
avowed purpose of the drafters was to place limitations on governmental control. Our 
constitution aims at establishing freedom and equality in a grossly disparate SOCiety." 










































LAW. DEMOCHACY Ii DEVELOPMENT 
violations of their rights by more powerful private parties (e.g. landlords. 
banks and insurance companies) The duty "to promote and fulfil" re-
quires the state to take positive measures to ensure that those persons 
who currently lack access to the rights gain access to them.' The UN 
Committee on Economic. Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) has identified 
two aspects of the duty to fulfiL The first is a duty to enable and assist 
communities to gain access to socio-economic rights. This would include, 
for example, adopting framework policies and legislation that facilitate 
and regulate access [() socio-economic rights. The second is a duty to 
provide the right directly, whenever an indiVidual or group is unable, for 
reasons beyond their control, to gain access to the right through the 
means at their disposal. The latter aspect of the duty to fulfil is thus clearly 
targeted at groups in especially vulnerable situations.'; 
3 SOOBRAMONEY: "A COURT WILL BE SLOW TO INTERFERE" 
Soobramoney was the first major Constitutional Court case to consider the 
enforceability of socio-economic rights.' The applicant. an unemployed 
man in the final stages of chronic renal failure. sought a positive order 
from the courLS directing a state hospital to provide him with ongoing 
dialysis treatment, and interdicting the provincial Minister of Health from 
refusing him admission to the renal unit of the hospital. Without this 
treatment the applicant would die. as he could not afford to obtain the 
treatment from a private clinic. He relied primarily on section 27(3) of the 
Constitution, the right against the refusal of emergency medical treat-
menL He also argued that section 27(3) should be construed consistently 
with the right to life in section I I of the Constitution. The application was 
dismissed in the High Court and was taken on appeal to the Constitutional 
Court. 
Chaskalson P commenced the judgment with an oft-quoted passage, 
recognising the circumstances of poverty and economic inequality [hat 
exist in our country'-" This passage is significant, firstly, because it estab-
lishes the strong link between socio-economic rights and the foundational 
constitutional values of human dignity, equality and freedom." Secondly, 
it affirms that the comm itment LO address these conditions of poverty and 
inequality and transform our society based on human dignity, equality 
26 f)e Vos 19')7: 78 q I. Lletwllberg 200 I: 410-420 
27 St'C General (Ollilnelli No. 12. supra nUle 24. par 15; General COlllment No. 14. supru 
Ilote 24. par 37. 
28 SooiJramonf'Y. supra Ilote '). 
2'1 ·'We live in a society in which tilere are great dispdnlies tn wcallh. Millions of people 
are living in deplorahle cOlldirions and in great poverty Tllfre is a lugh level of unem-
pIOYIn('lli. inadc4Uilie social securilY. and many do nol have access {() clean water or to 
adequate ilcalih services. Tilese conditions already existed when the Constitution was 
adopt cd and a conUllitlllt'rH to address them, and to Iranstorll1 our society Into onc ill 
which there will be human dignity. freedonl and eqllaliry. lies at the heart of Ollr new 
conslillJlionalorder r;or a~ lung as these COI1(1itions continue to (,xist thaI aspiration Will 
have a 1101Iow ring" (par RL 










































SOUTH AFRICA'S EVOLVING JURISPRUDENCE ON SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS 
and freedom is a central constitutional purpose. Finally, it acknowledges 
that as long as these conditions persist, "that aspiration will have a hollow 
ring". In other words, realising socio-economic rights is indispensable to 
the success of South Africa's constitutional democracy and to ensuring 
that the core constitutional values are meaningful to the whole population 
of the country. This perspective suggests the development of a bold and 
robust jurisprudence on socio-economic rights. However, the judgment 
reveals a Court anxious to establish a restrained role for itself in their 
enforcement. 
The Court decided that the applicant's demand to receive renal dialysis 
treatment at a state hospital did not fall within the scope of the right 
against the refusal of "emergency medical treatment" protected in section 
27(3) of the Constitution. It observed that the right is cast in negative 
terms. Its scope is thus restricted to a right to receive immediate remedial 
treatment that is "necessary and available" to avert harm in the case of a 
sudden catastrophe. It does not extend to the provision of ongoing treat-
ment of chronic illnesses for the purpose of prolonging life." 
The restriction of the scope of the right to genuine medical emergencies 
seems appropriate. More problematic is the suggestion that the scope of 
section 27(3) is confined to existing services and facilities providing emer-
gency medical treatment. It remains to be determined to what extent 
section 27(3) may be relied on to argue for a positive duty on the state to 
establish emergency medical facilities where none previously existed. 
Similarly, it is an open question whether this provision can be relied on to 
challenge the closure of existing emergency facilities, for example, due to 
budgetary cutbacks. This possibility would be particularly important in 
circumstances where the closure results in communities being denied any 
access to emergency medical treatment. There is no obvious textual or 
purposive basis for a purely negative interpretation of section 27(3), which 
limits its scope to a denial of access to existing emergency services or 
facilities.32 
It is instructive to compare the approach of the Indian Supreme Court in 
the case which the Court relied on to support its interpretation of the 
scope of emergency medical treatment, Paschim Banga Khet Mazdoor 
Samity and Others v State of West Bengal and Another. 33 The Supreme Court 
derived the right to emergency medical treatment from the right to life 
protected in article 21 of the Indian Constitution. However, the judgment 
did not confine itself to ordering compensation to the victim for the 
31 "The purpose of the right seems to be to ensure that treatment be given in an emer-
gency, and is not frustrated by reason of bureaucratic reqUirements or other formali-
ties" (par 20). 
32 On the contrary, as Scott & Alston point out, the purely negative interpretation given to 
s 27(3) would appear to make it a redundant right in the light of the negative duty on 
the state under s 27(1) [Q desist from preventing or impairing the right of access to 
health care services (2000: 245-248). This negative duty was recognised in Grootboom 
in respect of s 26 (1) (supra note 10. par 34). Furthermore, it remains to be tested 
whether the negative duty imposed by s 27(3) also binds private health care facilities. 










































LAW, DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
negative violation of his right, but also focused on the positive measures 
needed to ensure "that proper medical facilities are available for dealing 
with emergency cases";' The order of the Court included far-reaching 
positive duties on the state to im prove emergency health care infrastruc-
ture and services. In this regard the Court considered it necessary for "a 
time-bound plan for providing these services" to be drawn up and imple-
mented. 
Having dismissed the appellant's claim under section 27(3), the Court 
then proceeded to consider Mr Soobramoney's claim under section 
27( I )(a), read with (2);' In conSidering this claim, the Court indicated that 
a large margin of discretion would be given to the setting of budgetary 
priorities by the provincial government, and the "difficult decisions" made 
by the hospital administrators in the context of limited resources: 
A court will be slow to interfere with rational decisions taken in good faith by 
the political organs and medical authorities whose responsibilities it IS to deal 
with such matlers" 
It held that there was no suggestion that the gUidelines drawn up by the 
hospital authorities for determining which patients qualified for dialysis 
treatment were unreasonable. or that they had not been applied "fairly 
and rationally" in the applicant's case. The Court thus declined to order 
the provision of dialysis treatment. 
Of course, the real dispute was not whether the medical authorities had 
devised reasonable gUidelines for rationing access to the dialysis treat-
ment that was currently available, but whether sufficient funds had been 
allocated to provide dialysis treatment to those in the appellant's posi-
tion. A key factor in the Court's reasoning was clearly the degree of 
interference in social and budgetary policies that an order, requiring the 
state to provide dialysis treatment to the applicam and to all other persons 
similarly situated, would reqUire. The principle would have to be applied 
not only to all persons suffering from chronic renal failure, but also "to all 
patients claim ing access to expensive medical treatment or expensive 
drugs"." This in turn would reqUire the health budget "to be dramatically 
increased to the prejudice of other needs which the state has to meet"." 
Soobramoney was clearly an unfortunate first test case for the enforce-
ment of socia-economic rights. It entailed a claim for expensive, tertiary 
level care with no reasonable hope of curing Mr Soobramoney's condition. 
The judgment Signalled that the Court would proceed with caution in deve-
loping its jurisprudence on socia-economic rights. The political and ad-
ministrative organs of state would be afforded a wide latitude in realising 
34 Ibid par I;:' 
Yi Ibid par 16. See Ihe discussion by Scolt &. Alslon or this Cd;'C. ;:00(1. 237 ane! 2,15 248 
36 Tile qualified right or access to heallh (dre services 
37 Ibid par 2'1. 
38 Ibid par 2 ~). 
39 Ibid par 2'3 











































SOUTH AFRICA'S EVOLVING JURISPRUDENCE ON SOCIQ,ECONOM1C RIGHTS 
socio-economic rights, particularly in relation to setting social and budget-
ary priorities. Already at this stage the Court's aversion to recognising an 
individual right to a particular social service, such as emergency health 
care, can be discerned through its restrictive interpretation of section 
27(3). The Court indicated that it would intervene under section 27( I) 
read with (2) only in situations were policies or legislation were irrational 
in their formulation or implementation. However, scant guidance was 
provided on the standard of 'irrationality' [0 be applied and the nature of 
the circumstances in which the Court would be prepared to intervene. 
Few took issue with the ultimate finding of the Court that there was no 
universal right [0 kidney dialysis treatment under present conditions. 
However, criticisms were voiced of the Court's reasoning:" The deferen-
tial signals sent by the Court were not conducive [0 litigating socio-
economic rights issues. It was almost two years before the next major test 
case on socio-economic rights, Grootboom, came before the courts. 
4 GROOTBOOM: OPTING FOR 'REASONABLENESS' REVIEW 
4.1 The High Court judgment 
This case concerned a group of adults and children who had moved onto 
private land from an informal settlement owing to the "appalling con-
ditions" in which they were living." They were evicted from the private 
land that they were unlawfully occupying. Following the eviction, they 
camped on a sports field in the area. However, they could not erect ade-
quate shelters as most of their building materials had been destroyed 
during the eviction. Accordingly. they found themselves in a precarious 
position where they had neither security of tenure. nor adequate shelter 
from the elements. 
They applied to the Cape High Court for an order against all three 
spheres of government [0 be provided with temporary shelter or housing 
until they obtained permanent accommodation." 
The High Court held that there was no violation of section 26 as the 
respondents had produced "clear evidence" of a "rational" housing pro-
gramme "designed to solve a pressing problem in the context of scarce 
financial resources". 45 
It then turned to consider the argument under section 28( I )(c), which 
gives every child an unqualified right to shelter. While accepting that the 
primary obligation to maintain a child rests on its parents, it held that the 
42 See. For example: Moellendort, 1998. Scott &. AlslOn 2000. Also see the discussion 
of the application ot' the right 10 life in the Soobramoney judgment by Piererse 1999: 
380-385. 
43 In the words of Judge Yacoob in the Constitutional Court judgment: "The root cause of 
[heir problems is [he intolerable conditions under which they were living while waiting 
in the queue for [heir turn to be allocated low-cost housing." Grootboom. supra note 10. 
par 3 
44 Grootboom v Oostenberg Municipality and Others 2000 (3) BCLR 277 (C). 










































LAW, DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
state incurs an obligation to provide rudimentary shelter for children 
when their parents are unable to do so." It went on to hold that the 
parents enjoyed a derivative right to be accommodated with their children 
in the aforesaid shelter, based on a jOint reading of section 28( I )(b), 
28( I )(c) and 28 (2) According to Davis J, it would not be in children's best 
interests to break up the family unit without justification: 
This would penalise the children and indeed their parents who, to a consider-
able extent owing to the rava~es of aparrheid, are unable to provide adequate 
shelter for their own children.' ' 
The Court refrained from being prescriptive as to the precise solution to 
be adopted to give effect to the right, but Indicated provisionally that 
"tents, portable latrines and a regular supply of water (albeit transported) 
would constitute the bare minimum"." The Court undertook a supervisory 
jurisdiction, ordering the respondents to report back to it on the imple-
mentation of the order and giving the applicants an opportunity to deliver 
their commentary on the state's report, 
The High Court was thus prepared to impose a direct duty on the gov-
ernment to provide certain tangible commodities to individuals in defined 
circumstances. This duty existed when parents were unable to secure 
shelter for themselves and their children as a result of their extremely 
vulnerable socio-economic circumstances. The Court clearly perceived the 
Soobramoney judgment to preclude anything other than a deferential 
standard of 'rationality review' in relation to section 26. It thus relied on 
the unqualified obligation imposed by section 28( I )(c) to afford relief to 
the Grootboom community. 
4.2 The Constitutional Court judgment 
4.2.1 A minimum core obligation? 
On appeal, the Constitutional Court was squarely faced with the question 
of whether to endorse an interpretation of socio-economic rights that 
would give individuals the right to claim tangible services from the state in 
particular circumstances. The issue was raised pertinently in the argu-
ments presented by the amici curiae in the case.'" 
Although the parties to the case focused their arguments on section 
28( I )(c), the amici successfully broadened the issues to include a consid-
eration of section 26 of the Constitution. They pointed to the unjust results 
of the reasoning of the Court a quo, which would exclude adults without 
children from shelter in crisis slluations while those with children ob-
tained relief. A central concern of the amici was to advance an interpreta-
tion that would reconcile the qualified rights of "everyone" to adequate 
46 Ibid 2885 C. 
47 Ibid 289(·· D 
48 I/Jid 2'J3A 
49 The Smull Alncan 1Il1l1hll1 Rigilis COlllllllssiol1 ,md tile COillllHlI1ity I.aw (emre (Univer-











































SOUTH AFRICA'S EVOLVING JURlSPRUDENCE ON SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS 
housing in section 26 with the unqualified right of children to shelter in 
section 28( I )(c), They did so by arguing as follows: 
• Section 26( I) read with (2) imposes a minimum core obligation on the 
state to ensure that those who are truly homeless and in crisis situa-
tions receive some rudimentary form of shelter. The state has a burden 
to demonstrate that it has used all resources at its disposal to satisfy, 
as a matter of priority, its minimum core obligations. They derived 
support for this core obligation from the interpretation by the CESCR 
of the nature of states parties' obligations under the ICESCR, 
• Section 28( I )(c) is a specific manifestation of this minimum core obli-
gation, and places it beyond doubt that the basic socio-economic needs 
of children, in especially vulnerable circumstances, must be satisfied, 
The amici located the core within a continuum of positive obligations 
imposed on the state in section 26(1) read with (2): 
This does not imply that only the 'core' is subject to adjudication, or that 
meetmg the minimum core requirements would satisfy all of the obligations on 
the State, The 'core' provides a level of minimum compliance, to which re-
sources have to be devoted as a matter of priority, This duty clearly has to be 
balanced with the obligation to put into operation programmes aimed full 
realisation of the right, and to move progressively towards full realisation, 
The Constitutional Court affirmed that the foundational values of our 
society - human dignity, equality and freedom - are denied to those who 
lack access to socio-economic rights, Furthermore, socio-economic rights 
are necessary "to enable" people to enjoy the other rights in the Bill of 
Rights, and are also "key to the advancement of race and gender equality 
and the evolution of a society in which men and women are equally able 
to achieve their full potential". 52 
Given this perspective on the critical importance of socio-economic 
rights to the development of South Africa's new constitutional order, one 
expects the Court to be sympathetiC to an approach that argues that no 
one should fall below a basic 'floor' of social provisioning, However, 
despite its point of departure, the Court was not prepared to endorse the 
notion of a minimum core obligation in relation to section 26, It did so 
largely on the basis that it would be difficult to determine in abstract what 
the minimum threshold should be for the realisation of the rights as the 
50 General Comment No, 3 (Fifth session, 1990) The nature of states parties obligations (art 
2( /) of the Covenant) UN doc. EI 1991/23: 
The Commi[[ee is of the view that a minimum core obligation to ensure the satisfaction 
of, at the very least, minimum essential levels of each of the rights is incumbent upon 
every State party" In order for a State party to be able to auribute its failure to meet 
at least its minimum core obligations to a lack of available resources it must demon-
strate that every effort has been made to use all resources that are at its disposition in 
an effort to satisfy, as a matter of priority, those minimum obligations (par 10) 
51 Heads of Argument on behalf of the Amici Cunae, 10 September 2002. par 27. 
52 Grootboom, supra note 10, par 23 (per Yacoob J), Also see par I of the judgment (the 
state's constitutional obligations in relation to housing are "of fundamental importance 










































LAW. DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
opportunities for fulfilling these rights varied considerably. and needs 
were diverse.'" The only role envisaged by the Court for the concept of 
minimum core obligations was possibly in assessing the reasonableness of 
the measures adopted by the state in particular cases (the standard of 
review ultimately adopted). However, it would be necessary to place 
sufficient information before a court "to enable it to determine the mini-
mum core in any given context". 
4.2.2 Analysing section 26 
In analysing section 26, the Court held that subsections (I) and (2) are 
related and must be read together. Subsection (l) delineates the scope of 
the right. Firstly, the Court read into subsection (I) an implied negative 
obligation "placed upon the state and all other entities and persons to 
desist from preventing or impairing the right of access to adequate hous-
ing" . "" Locating this negative obligation in section 26( I) is significant as it 
suggests that resource arguments and the latitude of "progressive realisa-
tion" cannot playa role in justifying the deprivation of access to housing 
rights at the first stage of constitutional analysis. It is also noteworthy that 
the Court affirmed the horizontal application of the negative duty not to 
prevent or impair people's access to housing. 
Secondly. the Court indicated that it would give a substantive interpreta-
tion to the phrase. "access to adequate housing". Thus it is not enough 
that there are no formal barriers to accessing housing for those that can 
afford it. The state must put in place programmes that are targeted to-
wards assisting the poor to gain access to socio-economic rights. ,7 
The second subsection of section 26 defines the positive obligations 
imposed upon the state.' As will be recalled, the Court rejected the notion 
of a minimum core obligation on the state to provide a basic level of 
services to every individual in need. Instead, it held that the real question 
in a challenge based on a failure to fulfil the pOSitive duties under section 
26(2} was whether the legislative and other measures taken by the state 
were "reasonable". The Court was at pains to emphasise thal it would 
not be prescriptive as to which panicular policy choices were more desir-
able in realising socio-economic rights. It recognised that there could be a 
range of pOlicy choices that meet the standard of reasonableness. Pro-
vided the state could show that its choices met the standard. the Court 
would not interfere. 00 
53 'These will vary according 10 IdclOrs sucll as IIll'Ollle. tlfwiliploylllcnl. availability of 
land and poveny." (lllid par )2) 
54" . there are lhose who nc(:d IdOd: olllf'rs Ileed both lafl(1 and hOllses. yet orill'rs need 
finallcial assistallce." (Ibn! par 3).) 
CiS Illirl par 3) 
56 III the conrexl of housing rigllfs. IIlis negative righl "is further speir our in subs (3) wilich 
prohihirs arbitrary eVictions". (fIlii! par )1) 
57 Ibid pars 35 and 36. 
58 Ibid par '3H 
59 IlJid {ldrs 33 and 41. 










































SOUTH AFRICA'S EVOLVlNGJURISPRUDENCE ON SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS 
4.2.3 Establishing the principles of reasonableness review 
The Court then proceeded to flesh out the standard of reasonableness in 
the context of assessing the state's positive obligations to realise socio-
economic rights. The following criteria for a reasonable government pro-
gramme to realise socio-economic rights can be distilled from the judgment: 
The programme must be a comprehensive and coordinated one, 
which clearly allocates responsibilities and tasks to the different 
spheres of government and ensures that "the appropriate financial 
and human resources are available"."' Although each sphere of gov-
ernment is responsible for implementing parts of the programme, 
national government has the overarching responsibility of ensuring 
that the programme is adequate to meeting the state's constitutional 
obligations. b£ 
2 The programme "must be capable of facilitating the realisation of the 
right," albeit on a progressive basis and within the state's available 
means. b } 
3 Policies and programmes must be reasonable "both in their concep-
tion and their implementation",M 
4 The programme must be "balanced and flexible and make appropri-
ate provision for attention to housing crises and to short, medium and 
long-term needs" (sic). A reasonable programme cannot exclude "a 
significant segment of society"."5 
5 The programme must include a component that responds to the urgent 
needs of those in desperate situations, Thus a reasonable programme, 
even though it is statistically successful in improving access to housing, 
cannot "leave out of account the degree and extent of the denial of 
the right they endeavour to realise","" Elsewhere in the judgment more 
detail is provided on what this component requires, Thus the state 
must "plan, budget and monitor the fulfilment of immediate needs 
and the management of crises". According to the Court: 
This must ensure that a Significant number of desperate people in need are 
afForded relieF, though not all of them need receive it immediately [em-
phasis added] 67 
The Court justified this latter component on the basis that we value hu-
man beings and the Constitution requires us to treat everyone with "care 
and concern". Furthermore, a society based on human dignity, equality 
and freedom strives [0 ensure that the basic necessities of life are pro-
vided to all, One can discern a distinct tension in the Court's reasoning. 
61 Ibid par 39, 
62 Ibid par 40. 
63 Ibid par 41 
64 Ibid par 42. 
65 Ibid par 43. 
66 Ibid par 44. 
67 Ibid par 68. 










































LAW. DEMOCHACY &. DEVELOPMENT 
The individual rights perspective suggested by the latter justification 
implies that each person who cannot secure his or her own basic needs is 
entitled to direct state assistance (akin to the minimum core obligation 
notion). On the other hand, the passage quoted above indicates that the 
state's duty is to adopt and implement a reasonable programme that 
includes measures aimed at providing relief for a significant number of 
people in desperate need. However, no individual is entitled to claim 
immediate access to particular goods or services. The implications of this 
approach will be discussed further below. 
It was on the basis of the last aspect of the reasonableness test that the 
government's housing programme was faulted. After a comprehensive 
evaluation of the state's housing programme, the Court concluded that it 
represented "a major achievement" and "a systematic approach to a 
pressing social need". However, it failed to meet the Constitutional test 
of reasonableness in that it was focussed only on medium- and long-term 
objectives and did not include measures to provide short-term relief to 
those in desperate need.'" In its order, the Court declared that the state 
housing programme did not comply with section 26(2): 
in that it failed to make reasonable provision within its available resources 
for people in the Cape Metropolitan area with no access to land, no roof oyer 
their heads, and who were living In Intolerable conditions or crisis situations.' I 
Reference was made to the Accelerated Managed Land Settlement Pro-
gramme, which had been drafted but not implemented by the Cape 
Metropolitan Council, as an example of the type of measure that would be 
appropriate to provide emergency relieF. 
4.2.4 Interpreting "progressive realisation" and resource availability 
The Court interpreted the phrase "progressive realisation" in section 26(2) 
(0 impose a duty on the state (0 examine "legal, administrative, opera-
tional and financial hurdles" and, where possible, (0 lower these over 
time, Housing should be made accessible "not only to a larger number of 
people but to a wider range of people as time progresses" 
No mention was made of a possible qualitative interpretation of "pro-
gressive realisation". This would imply not only that a greater number of 
people have access to the rights over lime, but also that there are progres-
sive improvements in the standard of housing to which disadvantaged 
groups have access, This is regrettable given that a qualitative dimension 
is imported into the scope of the right through the phrase "adequate 
housing" in section 26( 1 ).'1 However, the Court's endorsement of the 
69 Ibid pars 53-54. 
70 Ibid par 6'l. 
71 Ilml par ')'l. 
72 Ihid pars 60,61, am167. 
73 Ihid par 45. 
74 [0 rhe amici. rlw phrase 'progressive realisation' "imposes a duty to arlopr an 
172 
incremental approach UO[11 as to numbers. and as to what is provided" (Heads of Ar-
gument, par 58.2.) The (ESCR has identilied a number 01 qualitarive factors [() ue taken 
into account in assessing the of housing provision: General Comment No.4 









































SOUTH AFRlCA'S EVOLVING JURISPRUDENCE ON SOC10·ECONOMIC RIGHTS 
CESCR's views on "retrogressive measures" is likely to prove significant. 75 
According to the Committee: 
... any deliberate retrogressive measures ... would require the most careful 
consideration and would need to be fUlly justified by reference to the totality of 
the rights provided for in the Covenant and in the context of the full use of the 
maximum available resources [emphasis addedj.76 
The state's positive obligations to fulfil the rights in sections 26(2) and 
27(2) are qualified by reference [0 its "available resources". According to 
the Constitutional Court, this means that: 
.. both the content of the obligation in relation to the rate at which it is 
achieved as well as the reasonableness of the measures employed to achieve 
the result are governed by the availability of resources [emphasis added]J7 
The Court thus left Iinle doubt that the resources available for social 
programmes would be a determining fac[Or in the assessment of the 
reasonableness of the measures adopted by the state. 
4.2.5 Children's socio-economic rights 
Turning to a consideration of the unqualified socio-economic rights of 
children in section 28( 1 )(c), the Constitutional Court found no violation of 
the right of children to shelter. The Court read section 28( I )(b) and (c) 
together, holding that the former provision defined those responsible for 
giving care. while the latter "lists various aspects of the care entitle-
ment".78 Thus the primary duty to fulfil a child's socio-economic rights 
rests on that child's parents or family. It is only when a child lacks familx 
care that the state incurs the obligation to provide shelter to him or her. 9 
As the children in this case were in the care of their parents or families, 
they were not entitled to any relief in terms of section 28( 1 Hc). 
According to the Court, the "carefully constructed constitutional scheme 
for progressive realisation of socio-economic rights would make little 
sense if it could be trumped in every case by the rights of children to get 
shelter from the state on demand".80 
This further illustrates the Court's reluctance [0 interpret even the un-
qualified socio-economic rights provisions in the Constitution to include 
an individual claim for direct material assistance from the state. A direct 
entitlement to the provision of shelter under section 28( I Hc) only arises in 
the limited circumstances of children who, for example, have been or-
phaned. abandoned or removed from parental care.
SI 
The claims of 
children in families who are too poor to provide them with the basic 
necessities of life fall to be determined in terms of sections 26 and 27. As 
noted. these sections do not impose any direct obligation on the state to 
provide socio-economic goods and services to anyone, only a qualified 
obligation to adopt a reasonable programme. 
75 See Grootboom. supra note 10. par 45. 
76 General Comment NO.3. supra note 50. par 9. 
77 Grootboom. supra note 10. par 46. 
78 Ibid par 76. 
79 Ibid par 77. 
80 Ibid par 71 










































LAW. DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
4.3 Evaluating Grootboom 
4.3.1 The rejection of minimum core obligations 
The Crootboom judgment represents a landmark in the development of 
the jurisprudence on socio-economic rights In a much more substantial 
judgment than that delivered in Soobramoney, the Court elaborated in 
detail its approach to the interpretation of these rights. 
A profound development in the evolution of its jurisprudence on socio-
economic rights is the refusal to read a minimum core obligation into 
section 26 (and, by implication, section 27). The Court's justification for 
rejecting the minimum core obligation on the basis of its complexity is 
unconvincing. Similar interpretative problems arise in relation to deter-
mining what falls within the scope of rights in the Bill of Rights, such as 
the right to human dignity. life. freedom and security of the person, and 
fair labour practices.'· An acceptance of the concept of minimum core 
obligations does not require the Court to define in abstract the precise 
basket of goods and services that must be provided. Instead it could 
define the general principles underlying the concept of minimum core 
Obligations in relation to socio-economic rights. and apply these contextu-
ally on a case-by-case basis. 
The standard for determining the minimum core obligation should be 
informed by its underlying purpose: the desire to protect vulnerable 
people from serious social and economic threats to their survival, health, 
and basic functioning in SOCiety. Without a recognition of this basic stan-
dard, the enjoyment of all other rights is imperilled and the foundational 
constitutional values of human dignity, equality and freedom will, to 
borrow the memorable phrase from Soobramoney, "have a hollow ring"."' 
The minimum core protects the survival interests of human beings, and 
provides a basic platform for enabling their participation in society:" 
It is also important to note that the minimum core obligation does not 
necessarily imply universal access to free basic services, although gov-
ernment could certainly elect to fulfil its minimum core obligations 
through programmes of this nature. When people can satisfy their own 
basic needs because of the resources they command, the state has no 
obligation to provide them with free access to socio-economic rights. As 
the Court acknowledged in Crootboom. the minimum core obligation "is de-
termined generally by having regard to the needs of the most vulnerable 
group that is entitled to the protection of the right in question"'/ In assess-
ing whether there has been a violation of the minimum core obligation, 
82 See ss I (). I I. 1 2. 2'3 ( 1 ) 
83 Sooliramollf'Y. supra nOle 9, par H. Also see Groot/worn, slIpra nute I n. par 23. 
84 See Ihe discussion by Bilchitz 2002 of 111(' irueresis lilat lile ll1irtirlHllll core obligalion is 
designed {O protect. 
85 Sec Haysorn. supra nOlC 1 '3, 
86 Ille evaluation of government's policy of free basic Wdlf!r services III De Visser, 
COllie 0< Meltler in Ihis voluille. 
87 GrooliJoom. supra note I n. par 31. Also see par 16. "Tile poor are p;micularly vulnerable 










































SOUTH AFRICA'S EVOLVING JURISPRUDENCE ON SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS 
the actual circumstances of the group affected is thus a relevant factor. 
Vulnerable groups experiencing severe socio-economic deprivation would 
have a directly enforceable right to a basic level of material assistance 
from the state. 
It is also unnecessary for a Court to be prescriptive in every case as to 
the precise services that must be rendered to remedy the violation. It 
could do what the High Court did in Grootboom, and indicate the broad 
parameters of what is required to remedy the breach, while leaving a 
margin of discretion to the state to decide on the most appropriate means 
of fulfilling its core obligations.
so 
In a situation of a community facing 
starvation this could include, for example, cash grants, food vouchers or 
the direct delivery of foodstuffs to the affected community:o 
The Court does not escape the interpretative diffjculties of clarifying the 
state's obligations in relation to socio-economic rights by rejecting the 
minimum core obligation. The review standard of "reasonable measures" 
endorsed by the Court does not lend itself to easy definition or applica-
tion. The needs and opportunities for enjoying rights are surely also 
relevant to an assessment of the reasonableness of the measures adopted 
by the state. The component of the reasonableness test requiring gov-
ernment programmes to provide relief for those in desperate need and 
living in intolerable conditions is vague and leaves many questions unan-
swered. In the South African context of extreme and widespread poverty, 
how does one define the groups that government programmes must 
specifically cater for, and what forms of relief must be provided?"' 
The obVious response is that normative clarity will be developed 
through a process of application of the Grootboom principles to the facts of 
particular cases. A similar response can be made to concerns about the 
indeterminacy of minimum core obligations. As I have argued, the un-
derlying purpose of recognising minimum core obligations can gUide the 
evaluation of whether, in concrete cases, a particular service or resource 
must be provided by the state to the applicants.
92 
88 Tllis is consistent with the interpretation of the CESCR of tile duty to fulfil SOCiO-
economic rights: see above note 27 and accompanying text. Another example where the 
vulnerable status of the group in question is a factor in determining whether there has 
been a Violation of a constitutional right is the contextual enquiry into whether discrimina-
tion is unFair in the circumstances: see President of the Republic of South Africa v Hugo 
1997 (6) BCLR 708 (CC), par 1 12; Harksen v Lane 1997 (I I) BCLR 1489 (CC), pars 50-53. 
89 The High Court did this through the medium of a supervisory order. See Trengove 1998: 
9. 
90 Both s 38 and s 172(1)(b) vest the courts with a wide discretion to formulate appropri-
ate remedies and to make any order that is "just and equitable". Practical obstacles to 
proViding immediate relieF can thus be dealt with through Formulating an appropriately 
Flexible remedy eg a supervisory order. See the discussion by Bilchitz of the application 
of a temporary suspension order in the context of minimum core obligations (forth-
coming, 2003). 
91 See further in this regard, Uebenberg 2001: 234-237. 
92 Over time it is inevitable that certain aspects of the minimum core obligation will 
crystallise in relation to the variOUS socio-economic rights, For example, a right to be 
immunised major infectious diseases as a core entitlement of the right to health 










































LAW. DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
A possible rejoinder could be that the very component of the Grootboom 
reasonableness test that requires specific measures to cater for the urgent 
needs of vulnerable groups, achieves the same net effect as that desired 
by proponents of the minimum core obligation. However, there are three 
crucial points of difference between the minimum core approach and the 
reasonableness test as developed in Grootboom. 
In the first instance, as noted, the Grootboom judgment does not confer 
a right upon any individual to claim anything tangible from the state. The 
right recognised in Grootboom is a right to demand that the state adopts a 
reasonable programme. Such a programme must include a component 
that ensures relief for a significant number of desperate people, although 
not all of them need receive it immediately. This has enormous practical 
implications for poor individuals or communities who want to use litiga-
tion as a tool to protect their socio-economic rights. It means that they will 
not receive any direct individual relief, although they may indirectly 
benefit from a positive order handed down by the courts. As Scott & 
Alston point out. public interest groups are likely to bring socio-economic 
rights cases if they result in changes to policies and legislation that make 
them more responsive to the needs of disadvantaged groups. This is 
certainly an important and valuable outcome for socio-economic rights 
litigation. However, individual claimants "will understandably wish to see 
something geared more to their own situation and are unlikely to wish to 
bring constitutional cases purely to serve as constitutional triggers for 
general policy processes"." 
A second difference relates to the failure of the Court to require that the 
"intolerable conditions" of vulnerable and disadvantaged groups be allevi-
ated as a matter of priority. As Theunis Roux has pointed out, the Court 
did not say that providing relief for those in desperate need must occur 
before improvements are made to the social benefits enjoyed by relatively 
more advantaged groups (temporal prioritisation). He argues that the 
jurisprudence in Grootboom is not condUCive to challenging the expendi-
ture of scarce resources on relatively privileged groups provided that the 
state makes some provision for ameliorating the situation of those in 
need."4 It may be permissible for the state to ensure minimum 
core obligations within an integrated programme, which also ensures 
higher levels of provisioning. However, what should be prohibited is for 
the state to improve the social position of advantaged social groups with-
0111 meeting its minimum core obligations towards vulnerable groups. 
Moreover, as the amici emphasised, the state's obligations are not re-
stricted to the minimum core. It also has a duty to devise and implement 
reasonable programmes that will enable it to achieve full realisation of the 
rights over time. 
93 SCO([ & 1\lslOn 200(): 251 255. 
94 I\oux. 2002: I 17 I 18. 
95 In IllallY contexts. Ihe most etfecriv(; WdY oilTleeting basiL lleeds is IhrolJ!4h fldopting fin 
irllcgrated. holistic social prograrmne. which includes baSic anel tl'rliary services: lor ex-










































SOUTH AFRICA'S f,:VOLVINGJURlSPRUDENCE ON SOCia-ECONOMIC RIGHTS 
A third difference relates to the burden of proof on litigants seeking to 
use the courts to enforce their socio-economic rights. In terms of Groot-
boom, litigants who allege a violation of their socio-economic rights under 
sections 26 or 27 bear the burden of proving that government has acted, 
or failed to act, reasonably. This requires litigants to review government's 
policies, programmes and legislation within the national, provincial and 
local spheres of government. The Court also indicated that it would take 
into account the "interconnectedness of rights" in assessing whether the 
state had fulfilled its obligations.% This compounds the difficulties that 
vulnerable groups will face in mounting a successful challenge based on 
section 26. Not only will they have to review all aspects of the housing 
programme, but also the entire panoply of social programmes adopted by 
the state. The Court also made it clear that reasonableness would be 
assessed in the light of the "available resources" of the state. This will 
reqUire litigants to identify and quantify the resources available to the 
state for the purposes of the relevant socio-economic rights and then to 
determine whether the measures in fact taken are reasonable in the light 
of those available resources.'s 
In contrast, in terms of the minimum core approach, an individual will 
succeed in establishing a primajacie violation if she can show: 
1 that she lacks access to basic subsistence reqUirements: and 
2 that these basic needs are neither physically nor economically acces-
sible to her. 
The burden will then shift to the state to show that "every effort has been 
made to use all the resources at its disposal in an effort to satisfy, as a 
matter of priority, those minimum obligations"."" Moreover, the state has 
the further possibility of attempting to justify its failure to fulfil minimum 
core obligations in terms of the general limitations clause (section 36). 
4.3.2 The opportunities and challenges of Grootboom 
Despite the above concerns regarding the rejection of the concept of mini-
mum core obligations, the judgment creates a number of important oppor-
tunities for socio-economic rights litigation. 
In the first place, it recognises the negative duty to respect access to 
socio-economic rights under the first subsections of sections 26 and 27. 
96 Grootboom, supra note 10, par 24. 
97 Among the measures that the Court indicated would be relevant in relation to promot-
ing access to housing were steps to make the rural areas of our country more viable so 
as to limit the migration of people from rural to urban areas in search of jobs (Groot-
boom. supra note 10. par 34). It also indicated that social assistance programmes put in 
place under s 27 "WOUld be relevant to the state's obligations in respect of other socio· 
economic rights" (par 36). 
98 This critique of the Grootboom judgment was made on behalf of two amici in the TAe 
case: see submissions of the Community Law Centre and the Institute for Democracy in 
Africa (ldasal. April 2002. pars 31 .1-31.4. 











































LAW, DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
This will facilitate direct challenges to measures that "prevent or impair" 
people's access to socio-economic rights, unfettered by the complications 
of the second subsection, The Court's formulation of this negative obliga-
tion is broad, and potentially includes a range of situations, Classifying the 
facts of particular cases as a breach of the negative obligation under 
sections 26( I) or 2 7( I), or as a breach of the positive obligations under the 
second subsection, is likely to be contentious.'"'' A further significant 
aspect is that this negative duty is binding not only on the state, but also 
on private persons and entities, 
Grootboom is significant in comparative constitutional and international 
law as it illustrates that the positive duties imposed by qualified socio-
economic rights can be enforced by the couns'''' In contrast to the thin 
standard of rationality review of Soobramoney, the Court developed a set 
of detailed. substantial criteria for evaluating the reasonableness of gov-
ernment programmes in relation to socio-economic rights, 
This paves the way for judicial intervention in important situations 
where socio-economic rights may be violated, Three particular situations 
are worth highlighting. The first is when government programmes are 
designed to meet socio-economic needs over the medium- or long-term. 
and exclude short-term measures of relief for those in desperate situations 
and living in intolerable conditions. 
Second. litigants can challenge the unreasonable implementation of 
laws, policies and programmes as a breach of sections 26 or 27, This 
poses particular challenges to public interest organisations and lawyers to 
monitor and evaluate the practical impact of government programmes. A 
range of factors may contribute to unsatisfaclory implementation of a 
government programme, including insulTicient funding from national 
government. a lack of capacity among government offiCials, overly com-
plex regulations, or a lack of awareness by beneficiaries of the procedures 
to access government services, The challenge will be to accurately 
identify which aspects of the implementation of relevant government 
programmes are unreasonable and to propose suitable remedies, This will 
require interdiSCiplinary collaboration between human rights activists and 
lawyers, affected communities, puhlic policy experts, public health practi-
tioners, economists and the like, 
100 The filets of tlie l'AC case (iiscussed ill 5 ll"low ilfC il good ilhl::.triltion of tliis point. Was 
the prohibition on ttlt prescription 01 Neviraplflt: to IIIV posllive pregnaru women 
thfOUghout the public health sectof a breach of tile negative duty nOI ro prevent or im· 
pair access to health care services. or of the posilive duty 10 enSUfe progreSSive access 
to health care sf:rvices? The stdge at which il case comes belore court is also likely 10 be 
signific(\ul. The Groo{boom case WdS rrailled ill terms of non·fulfilment of the posilive 
duty [0 ensure sheller to [hose who were homeless. However. il the original eviclion 
frolll Itle private land had been cilallellged, the case could have revolved around [he 
negal ive duty nor to impair dccess to hOllsing in teflns of s 26( I) or 26(3): see Groot· 
iloom, supra note 10, pars 88-90. This raises IIw lunllCf issue of the apparent overlap 
between Ihe latter provisions, 
1 () I See Sunstein 2001 
102 On the problems In illlplelllelHilig social assistilllce progriltlll1leS in South Africa, see 










































SOUTH AFRlCA'S EVOLVING JURlSPRUDENCE ON SOCIO-ECONOMIC RlGHTS 
The third area where the Court's jurisprudence in Grootboom is helpful 
. is in challenging retrogressive measures that have the effect of reducing 
access to socio-economic rights and, arguably, also those measures that 
reduce the quality or level of benefit that people enjoy. As noted above, 
the Court expressly endorsed the view of the CESCR that retrogressive 
measures require strong justification by the state. 
The role of resource limitations will continue to be highly contested ter-
rain in the developing jurisprudence on socio-economic rights. Grootboom 
indicated that the availability of resources would be an important factor in 
determining what is reasonable. However, the Court did not indicate how 
it would assess the availability of resources. Would it accept, without 
question, the budgetary allocations by the three spheres of government, 
or would these also be subject to review for their 'reasonableness'? 
The Court indicated that a reasonable government programme must 
"ensure that the appropriate human and financial resources are avail-
able". 04 However, it did not unequivocally affirm that the allocation of 
resources to relevant government programmes must be reasonable and 
capable of facilitating the realisation of socio-economic rights. This would 
perhaps have constituted too open an invitation to directly challenge 
resource allocation decisions. The Court is not averse to its decisions 
having budgetary implications, but is unlikely to be receptive to a direct 
challenge to budgetary priority setting.'oo The critical question is the extent 
to which its decisions will be allowed to impact on budgets, especially in 
situations where litigants challenge the absence of a programme that they 
contend is essential to the realisation of a particular socio-economic right. 
The state is likely to argue that resources are not available for the particu-
lar programme. Time will tell how deferential the Court will be in scruti-
nising the validity of this claim. lOb 
The Grootboom principles also enable government to assist vulnerable 
groups, and to defend its actions against challenges by more powerful 
private groups. This is illustrated in the case of Minister oJ Public Works 
103 The Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic Social and Cultural Rights give the 
following examples of violations under the ICESCR: 
"The adoption of any deliberately retrogressive measure that reduces the extent [0 
which any such right is guaranteed: 
The reduction or diversion of specific public expenditure. when such reduction or 
diversion results in the non-enjoyment of such rights and is not accompanied by ade-
quate measures to ensure minimum subsistence rights for everyone" (pars 14(e) and 
(g). 
The Maastricht Guidelines are non-binding but innuential interpretations of the Obliga-
tions imposed by the ICESCR by a group of experts in international law. 
104 Grootboom. supra note 10, par 39. later on in the judgmem, the Court says that the 
effective implementation of programmes "requires at least adequate budgetary support 
by national government". A nationwide housing programme must recognise immediate 
needs and this requires national government "to plan, budget and monitor the fulFilment 
of immediate needs and the managemeru of crisis" (par 68) (emphasis added). 
105 See Roux, 2002 (unpublished). 
106 If resource allocation decisions are insulated from judicial scrutiny. the state will in 
effect be permitted to determine the extent of its own constitutional obligations in rela-
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and Others v Kyalami Ridge Environmental Association and Others. In 
defending its decision to establish a transit camp to house people from 
Alexandra Township who had been displaced by severe floods, the state 
relied on its constitutional obligation (as affirmed in Grootboom) to assist 
people in crisis situations. A neighbouring residents' association challenged 
this decision on the grounds that there was no legislation authorising the 
government to establish the transit camp and that the decision was unlaw-
ful in that it contravened a town planning scheme as well as land and 
environmental legislation. The Constitutional Court held that none of the 
laws relied on by the association excluded or limited the government's 
common law power to make Hs land available to flood victim~opursuant to 
Its constitutional duty to provide them With access to housing .. 
Finally. the Grootboom judgment can make an important contribution to 
initiatives, other than litigation, aimed at promoting the realisation of 
socio-economic rights. The detailed criteria for a reasonable programme 
can guide government in designing, implementing. and evaluating its 
social programmes, the SAl-IRC in monitoring the realisation of socio-
economic rights, and civil SOCiety in its research and advocacy to promote 
these rights. 
5 MINISTER OF HEALTH V TAC: A STRATEGIC VICTORY 
The third in the trilogy of socio-economic rights decided by the Constitu-
tional Court concerned the application by the Treatment Action Campaign 
and others to compel the state to devise and implement an effective 
national programme to prevent or reduce mother-to-child transmission 
(MTCT) of IlIV. This included the provision of voluntary counselling and 
testing and of the anti-rerroviral drug, Nevirapine. 
5.1 The High Court judgment 
In granting the orders sought by applicant in substantially the terms 
sought, the High Court (Transvaal Provincial Division) relied extenSively 
on the reasoning in Grootboom."·' 
In the first place, the court held that the policy prohibiting the use of 
Nevirapine outside the 18 pilot sites in the public health sector constituted 
an unjustifiable barrier to the progressive realisation of the right to health 
care. It breached the negative to desist from impairing the right to health 
care. In the second place, the state's current MTCT prevention pro-
gramme failed the reasonableness test as it did not constitute a compre-
hensive and coordinated plan to prevent or reduce the MTCT of HIV. The 
state was not prepared to give an "unqualified commitment to reach the 
107 Minister or PU/Jlir Works lind Otlwrs v I\YIII(/)nl !?Idye Environmf'ntal Associarion and 
Others 200 I (7) IKLR 652 (Cf) 
108 Tn:'atment Action Campa/!fn lind Others v Minisler or lil'alth <lnd Others 2002 (4) Bel.l{ 
356 en. 
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rest of the population in any given time or at any given rate".' According 
to Botha J, a programme that is "open-ended and that leaves every-
thing for the future cannot be said to be coherent. progressive and 
purposeful".' ; 
A bold feature of the judgment is the rejection of the state's arguments 
that the availability of resources would determine whether there would be 
a further roll out of a national MTCT prevention programme. According to 
Botha J the obligation to formulate a coherent plan to roll out such a 
national programme existed independently of the availability of resources. 
Only once such a plan existed could further resources be found "whether 
in the form of a reorganisation of priorities or by means of further budg-
etary allocations". He suggested that the availability of resources could 
only have an influence on the pace of the extension of the programme, 
not on the obligation to devise and implement such a plan.' 
This judgment was appealed to the Constitutional Court. 
5.2 The Constitutional Court judgment 
5.2.1 No minimum core obli9ation under section 27(1) 
As will be recalled, the Court in Grootboom rejected the arguments of the 
amici to the effect that section 26(2) read with section 26( 1) imposed a 
minimum core obligation on the state. 
Using a different interpretative route. two of the amici curiae in the TAe 
case again attempted to persuade the Court to impose minimum core 
obligations under section 27.'" They argued that every individual is enti-
tled to a basic core of health care services comprising the minimum 
necessary for dignified human existence in terms of section 27(1) read 
with the duty to fulfil the rights in section 7(2). This core right is not 
subject to the limitations of resource constraints and progressive realisa-
tion under section 27(2). Over and above this minimum core entitlement, 
the state is obliged, in terms of section 27 (2), to take reasonable measures 
within its available resources to achieve progressively the full realisation of 
the relevant rights. In other words, section 27(2) is not exhaustive of the 
state's positive duties. Instead, it supplements the unqualified core duty in 
terms of section 27( 1) with a qualified obligation to achieve the full reali-
sation of the rights over time. Subsection (2) thus speaks to those positive 
dimensions of the rights that cannot be realised immediately without 
excluding the core duty to fulfil those aspects that can. "4 
I 10 Supra note 108, 3850-E. 
1 I 1 Ibid 385F. 
1 12 Ibid 386B·C. 
I 13 The Community Law Centre (UWC) jOintly with Idasa. 
I 14 Although the two subsections of s 27 must be read together, they "must also not be 
conflated in a way that deprives subsections (I) of its normative content and reduces it 
to a mere definition used in the description of the duties imposed on the state in subs 










































LAW, DEMOCRACY 0< DEVELOPMENT 
They also argued that a purposive approach to the interpretation of the 
relevant socio-economic rights provisions supported a core entitlement to 
a basic level of services consistent with human dignity,' 'Practical justi-
ciability' was a key constitutional purpose, Accordingly, the relevant 
provisions should not be interpreted in a way that makes enforcement 
practically impossible, If section 27(2) is interpreted to be exhaustive of 
the state's positive duties. individual right holders have no direct right to 
claim anything specific from the slate, They can only demand that the 
state take reasonable measures within its available resources in terms of 
sections 26(2} and 27(2).'h Grootboom made it clear that any cause of 
action under the latter provisions "would almost always be a matter of 
such factual and legal complexity as to be beyond the capaCity of individ-
ual right holders. even if they have the benefit of legal representation","7 
In the context of the case, they argued that the minimum core of health 
services to which everyone is entitled to have access includes the provi-
sion of Nevirapine to pregnant women with HIV and to their newborn 
babies, The costs are relatively minor, the potential benefits to mother 
and child overwhelming, Denying access to the drug to those who are too 
poor to afford it would be a failure to respect their dignity and intrinsic 
worth as human beings.'" 
The Constitutional Court rejected this line of argument. It held that nei-
ther the drafting of the relevant sections, nor a purposive approach to the 
interpretation of socio-economic rights supported the interpretation 
advanced by the amici, It reaffirmed that section 27(2) defines and limits 
the full extent of the positive obligations imposed by section 27( I}, I" 
There is no separate positive right under s 27(1). According to the Court a 
purposive reading of section 27 "does not lead to any other conclusion." 
It is "impossible to give everyone access even to a 'core' service immedi-
ately" All that can be expected from the state, "is that it act reasonably to 
provide access to the socio-economic rights identified in sections 26 and 
27 on a progressive basis,'v 
The Court was also at pains to demonstrate that its interpretation of 
these provisions as developed in Grootboom was consistent with the 
institutional capabilities and functions of courts in a constitutional democ-
racy. Thus courts are nO[ "institutionally equipped to make the wide-
ranging factual and political enquiries necessary for determining what the 
minimum core standards, . , should be", Courts are also not the appro-
priate forum for adjudicating disputes where court orders "could have 
multiple social and economic consequences for the community",': While 
I 15 Ivid. pard 30 3 I , 
I 16 Ivu/ para 26 
117 Ibid p<lra 31 See rllC' evailldtioll 01 tile (jroulbuom jlldgm('nt in 4,3 above, 
I 18 Ibid para 60, 
I 19 Thus Ihe relerence 10 "thIS fight" ill S 26(2) and "earh 01 itl('S(- rights" ill S 27(2) refers 
to lilt' rights in ss 26(1) and 27( J) respcCllvely: TAe. sllpra now I I. (Jdrs 24- 31 
120 Ibid para 35. 
121 Ihid par '37, 










































SOUTH AFRICA'S EVOLVING JURISPRUDENCE ON SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS 
determinations of reasonableness may have budgetary implications, they 
were not directly aimed at "rearranging budgets".123 Having disposed of 
the minimum core argument, the Court proceeded to apply the principles 
of reasonableness review. 
5.2.2 The negative duty under section 27(1) 
The Court affirmed that the negative duty to refrain from preventing or 
impairing the relevant socio-economic rights, which it recognised in 
Grootboom, applied equally to the section 27(1). 
It will be recalled that the logical implication of locating the negative 
duty in the first subsection is that it is a directly enforceable right, which is 
not limited by reference to resource availability or progressive realisation. 
However, apart from indicating that this duty was "relevant" to the chal-
lenges to the measures adopted by the government to combat MTCT of 
HIV, the main thrust of the Court's analysis is in terms of section 27(2) -
the qualified positive duty to take reasonable measures. 
5.2,3 Applying the 'reasonableness' test 
The TAC and the other respondents alleged that the state programme for 
combating MTCT of HIV was unreasonable in two respects. Firstly, it 
unreasonably prohibited the administration of Nevirapine at public hospi-
tals and clinics outside the research and training sites. Secondly, the state 
failed to implement a comprehensive programme for the prevention of 
MTCTof HIV. 
The Court considered and rejected the range of reasons advanced by 
government for restricting the administration of Nevirapine to the re-
search and training sites. These included doubts about the efficacy of 
Nevirapine where "a comprehensive package of care"124 could not be 
made available, the development of resistance to the drug, safety, and 
capacity and budgetary concerns. 
It found that the policy of restricting the provision of Nevirapine im-
pacted seriously on a significant group of HIV positive mothers and chil-
dren who did not have access to the research sites. As they were too poor 
to purchase Nevirapine, they were effectively deprived of access to a "sim-
ple, cheap and potentially life-saving medical intervention".126 This restric-
tive policy was unreasonable in that it was inflexible and did not take into 
account the needs of a particularly vulnerable group.127 Government was 
123 Ibid. 
124 This would include counselling, provision of formula milk as a substitute for breast-
feeding. antibiotic treatment. vitamin supplements, and monitoring, during bottle-feed-
ing, the mother and children who have received Nevirapine Ibid par 49. 
125 Ibid pars 51-66. 
126 Ibid par 73. 
127 The Coun clearly considered poverty to be an important indicator of the vulnerability of 
the group in question: "There is a difference in the pOSitions of those who can afford to 
pay for services and those who cannot. State policy muSt take account of these differ-










































LAW. DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
thus ordered "without delay" to "remove the restrictions" that prevent the 
use of Nevirapine in the reduction of MTCT of HIV at public hospitals and 
clinics, and to "permit and facilitate" its use. It was specifically ordered to 
make the drug available for this purpose at hospitals and clinics where 
this is medically indicated, "which shall if necessary include that the 
mother concerned has been appropriately tested and counselled". I 
Turning to the second prong of the attack on government policy (the 
failure to adopt and implement a comprehensive MTCT prevention plan), 
the Court held that the rigidity of government's policy regarding the 
restrictive use of Nevirapine affected its whole policy on MTCT of H1V. 
At the time of the commencement of the proceedings a comprehensive 
policy for testing and counselling HIV positive pregnant women was in 
place, but it was not implemented uniformly" The Court held that the 
training of counsellors should now include training for counselling on the 
use of Nevirapine. In addition, government was ordered to take reason-
able measures to extend the testing and counselling facilities to all public 
hospitals and clinics "to facilitate and expedite" the use of Nevirapine for 
the purposes of reducing the risk of MTCT of HIV".'·· 
Unlike the High Court, it declined to make an order relating to the pro-
vision of formula milk as it raised "complex issues", and there was not 
sufficient evidence to justify an order that formula feed be provided free 
of charge by the government in every case.' 
Consistent with the paradigm of reasonableness review, the Court cau-
tioned that its findings did not mean "that everyone can immediately claim 
access to such treatment". The state's duty was to make "every effort" 
to extend access to this treatment "as soon as reasonably possible", ,11 
5,2,4 The additional requirement Of transparency 
A welcome feature of the judgment is the addition of the requirement of 
transparency to the constitutional requirement of reasonableness. It held 
that the enormous challenge that HIV/AIOS posed to all sectors of society 
could only be met if there is "proper communication, especially by gov-
ernment". In order for a programme to be "implemented optimally" its 
contents must be made known to all stakeholders. In this context, the 
Court regretted the fact that national government and six provinces had 
not disclosed any programme to extend access to Nevirapine treatment to 
prevent MTCT of HIV. ' 
12H Ibid par 131). 
12') lIJ1d piUS H2, (1). 
130 Ibid par 90. 
I 3 I Ihid pdf 95 
132 IUd par 12H. The complexities referred to include tlit, rislls to tile inlili1l of using 
formula milk wilen the mother does nOI Ildve easy access lu clean waler or Ihe ability to 
buttle feed safely iJecallse or her persofral circillllslarlCCs. 
133 IDidpar 125. 
134 Ibid. 
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5.2.5 Children's rights 
In considering the application of section 28( I )(c), the Court was at pains to 
emphasise that Grootboom should not be interpreted to imply that the 
state incurred "no obligation" in respect of children cared for by parents 
who were toO poor to afford health care services. 
However. consistent with its Grootboom reasoning. the Court did not 
find that children had a direct entitlement to basic health care services in 
circumstances where their parents were too poor to afford these services. 
Instead it relied on the right of children to basic health care services in 
section 28(1 )(c) to support its finding that government's rigid, restrictive 
policy on Nevirapine was unreasonable in that it excluded a particularly 
vulnerable group with severe implications for them. 
This was consistent with the Court's central enquiry throughout the case 
- whether the constitutional standard of reasonableness in section 27(2) 
had been met. '38 
5.2.6 Resource constraints 
The Court held that resource constraints were not an issue in relation to 
the first leg of the challenge - the restriction on prescribing Nevirapine in 
public health facilities where capacity existed to do so. The manufacturers 
of Nevirapine had offered to make it available to the government free of 
charge for a period of five years for the purposes of reducing the risk of 
MTCT of HIV.'39 Government's primary concern related to the costs of 
providing the infrastructure for the testing and counselling facilities and 
other elements of the optimal package of treatment of HIV positive preg-
nant women and their newborn infants. '4o However. the Court held that 
these resource-related concerns were relevant to the provision of a com-
prehensive package of care, and not to the provision of Nevirapine at 
those hospitals and clinics where testing and counselling facilities were 
a/ready in place. Accordingly. it held that its order on this aspect of the 
claims "will not attract any significant additional costs"." 
In relation to extending the MTCT programme, the Court found that it 
would not be a major burden for government to extend the training of 
136 Ibid par 77. 
137 "Their needs are 'most urgent' and their inability [0 have access to Nevirapine pro-
foundly affects their ability to enjoy all rights to which they are entitled." Ibid par 78. 
138 Ibid par 93. In Grootboom the Court indicated that the state's duties to fulfil the SOCiO-
economic rights of children who are being cared for by their parents or families are es-
sentially two-fold. First, the state must provide the legal and administrative infrastruc-
ture to guarantee that children receive the protection contemplated by s 28. Second, it 
must fulfil the qualified socio-economic rights in terms of ss 25.26 and 27 by extending 
families' access to them "on a programmatic and coordinated basis, subject to available 
resources" (par 78). Nowhere in the rAe decision is it suggested that s 28(1)c confers on 
children who are being cared ror by their families any direct entitlement to these socio-
economic rights. 
139 Ibid par 19. 
140 Ibid par 49. 
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counsellors based at public hospitals and clinics (other than the research 
sites) to include the use of Nevirapine in reducing the risk of MTCT of 
HIV.'IC In addition, the state was ordered to take, without delay, "reason-
able measures" to extend the testing and counselling facilities at hospitals 
and clinics throughout the public health sector "to Facilitate and expedite" 
the use of Nevirapine." 
The provincial health authorities responsible for implementing the test-
ing and counselling programme claimed that they faced both financial and 
capacity constraints. The T AC and the other respondents argued that it 
was cost-effective to adopt such a treatment plan. It would result in "sig-
nificant savings" for the state in later years, as it would reduce the num-
ber of HIV positive children who would have to be treated in the public 
hea Ith system. 144 
The Court took the view that it was not necessary to deal with the cost-
effectiveness argument, as there had been a significant change in condi-
tions since the proceedings were implemented. Thus some provinces like 
Gauteng and KwaZulu-Natal were rapidly expanding their provision of 
Nevirapine at public health facilitates beyond the test sites. According to 
the Court these developments demonstrated that substantial progress 
could be made "provided the requisite political will is present". ,4n How-
ever, more importantly, the Court had been informed at the hearing of the 
appeal that the government has made "substantial additional funds" 
available For the treatment of HIV. including the reduction of MTCT. '47 This 
conveniently allowed the Court to conclude that budgetary constraints 
were "no longer an impediment," and that it should now "be possible to 
address any problems of financial incapacity that might previously have 
existed". "0 
It would be interesting to speculate how the Court would have dealt 
with the resource constraints argument had the positive political devel-
opments just prior to the hearing not occurred. A serious engagement 
with the cost-effectiveness arguments raised by the T AC would have 
drawn the COUI l into a more direct evaluation of resource allocation 
decisions, something it is clearly reluctant to do. 
It is a pity that the Constitutional Court did not follow the High Court in 
afFirming that resource constraints do not excuse a failure on the part of 
the state to formulate a comprehensive plan to improve access to health 
care services. In the current case this would consist of a national treat-
ment plan to reduce the risk of MTCT of HIV tied to concrete goals and 
time frames. The recognition of such a duty would promote great public 
142 1/)1(1 sub'par 3(c) oillie Order (par 1351. and par en 
143 Ibid sub-par 3(d) 01 til(; Order (Pdf 135), 
144 Ib/(/par 116. 
145 [bid par I 18. 
146 [bid pdr I 19. 
147 [/Jidpar 120. 
148 Ibid. 
149 Tflis is cOllsistent wlih the ilpproilcil of the Cl'SCR: "Tile olJligilrion to monitor tile 
eXlelll of reillisillion. or Inore e~peciiilly of Ihe IHH1-rCdlis,uion. of econol1lic, social dnd 
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participation and accountability in the realisation of socio-economic rights. 
It would also lay the basis for targeted, purposeful action by the state 
towards the realisation of these rights. 
5.3 Evaluation of TAC 
The TAC case illustrates how the Grootboom jurisprudence can be used 
strategically to support a broader campaign to advance access to socio-
economic rights. The TAC had the organisational resources and capacity 
to demonstrate the unreasonableness of government's policies relating to 
MTCT of HIV. They were able to produce an impressive array of expert 
medical, public health and economics evidence to support their case. The 
successful outcome of the case reinforced the organisational gains that the 
T AC had made. ISO 
The judgment firmly entrenches reasonableness review for interpreting 
the socio-economic rights in sections 26 and 27. The Court was unequivo-
cal that these provisions do not confer any right on individuals to demand 
goods and services directly from the state. 
The rejection of minimum core obligations is inconsistent with the no-
tion that human rights vest in every human being by virtue of their hu-
manity and inherent dignity. lSI It is significant that sections 26 and 27, 
consistent with the overall conferral of individual rights in the Bill of 
Rights, commence with a freestanding right of "everyone" to have access 
to the relevant rights. In Soobramoney, the Court indicated that at times it 
would be required "to adopt a holistic approach to the larger needs of 
society rather than to focus on the specific needs of particular individuals 
within society" .152 This clearly establishes a distinction in the treatment of 
socio-economic rights. In relation to civil and political rights, "a holistic 
approach" to the needs of society can only be relied upon to limit individ-
ual rights under the general limitation clause. 
Certainly the drafting of sections 26 and 27 signal that resource con-
straints are a relevant factor in assessing compliance with the state's 
constitutional duties. Nevertheless it is possible to interpret these provi-
sions in a way that is consistent with the high degree of protection gener-
ally accorded to individual rights. As has been argued, a presumption of 
cultural rights, and to devise strategies and programmes for their promotion, are not in 
any way eliminated as a result of resource constraints". General Comment No 3, supra note 
50, par 1 I. In its General Comment No. 14 on the right to health, the Committee views the 
obligation to adopt a national public health strategy and plan of action as part of the "core 
obligations" of states parties. General Comment No. 14, supra note 24, par 43 (f). 
150 As observed by Geoff Budlender, the attorney for the TAC, "In some ways, the final 
judgment of the Constitutional Court was simply the conclusion of a battle which TAC 
had already won outside of the courts, but with the skilful use of the courts as part of a 
broader struggle". Mail & Guardian 2002. 
151 The preambles of both the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 1966 
and the lCESCR, 1966. state that the rights protected "derive from the inherent dignity 
of the human person". 
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violation can be found where vulnerable individuals lack access (0 the 
basic necessities of life. The state would then be placed under a strong 
burden of justification (0 show that it is unable to provide direct assistance 
(0 the applicants due to a serious shortage of resources. The standard of 
scrutiny would be high, and a court would not accept pre-existing budget-
ary allocations as determinative of resource availability without further 
justification. Moreover, the state retains the option of invoking the general 
limitations clause to justify its non-compliance with minimum core Obliga-
tions. These possibilities of justification meet the Court's concern that it 
is allegedly impossible to give everyone access to a "core" service imme-
diately."'" Reliance on the general limitations clause would have the added 
advantage that, when the state does limit its minimum core obligations, 
the fact of the limitation and its nature and extent would have to be 
pUblicly defined and justified. This would ensure public accountability in 
support of the constitutional commitment to ensure that everyone has 
access to an essential level of social services. 
The Court criticised the minimum core obligation as being ill-suited to 
its institutional role and capacities. In fact, there is little principled differ-
ence between imposing a minimum core obligation and upholding a duty 
that the state must "plan, budget and monitor" (0 ensure that "a signifi-
cant number of desperate people in need are afforded relief". Both 
duties require a process of interpretation in order to assess whether the 
relevant obligations have been fulfilled and both have irnplications for the 
state's distribution of resources. 
However, recognising an individual entitlement to such relief would be 
of immense practical benefit to litigants who seek the courts' assistance in 
situations of severe socio-economic deprivation, They would not be re-
quired to review a wide range of measures adopted by the state and to 
assess their reasonableness in the light of its available resources. Instead 
[hey would enjoy the benefit of a presumption that placed the burden on 
the state to justify why it is unable to provide direct relief. Furthermore, it 
would ensure that, in appropriate circumstances, they are entitled to 
direct individual relief. Finally, the state is likely to act with more serious-
ness and purpose to fulfil an obligation that can be individually enforced, 
than an ill-defined obligation to take reasonable measures to provide relief 
to significant numbers of those in desperate need.'" 
When dealing with more extensive levels of social provisioning, beyond 
minimum core Obligations, the standard of reasonableness review as 
developed in Crootboom and the rAe case would be appropriate. 
153 This approach accords Wilh the Dill' ildoptecl by Ihe amici in Groorvoom I.ocating the 
minilTllllTl core in 5 27( I) as argupd by tile amici in tlJ(' TAe Cdse. suggests lhat jusrilica-
[ion could oilly take place lfl terms 01 5 36 
154 This is in any event a conrenliolls statelllent. requirillg "vidence and justiticarion. 
155 Cruorvoom. slIpra note 10. pdr 68. 
156 See tile anOUrH by Piliay in rllis volulTlt' ot [he ditfi(lIlti('~ experielln:d in giving ellen to 
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6 CONCLUSIONS 
The above analysis of the constitutional jurisprudence indicates that the 
Constitutional Court is carving out an important role for itself in the en-
forcement of socio-economic rights. In the first place, it has created the 
possibility of challenging state or private action that prevents or impairs 
access to socio-economic rights - the negative duty "to respect" the rights. 
Secondly, the principles of reasonableness review provide the basis for 
chaJlenging the state for not giving effect to the positive duties imposed by 
socio-economic rights. Thus social programmes can be challenged for 
being poorly coordinated, unreasonably implemented or for not providing 
short-term relief for those in desperate need. The Court's endorsement of 
the views of the CESCR that retrogressive measures require special justifi-
cation is also likely to prove significant in challenging measures that 
reduce access to socio-economic rights. 
The degree of deference that the Court should accord to the state in 
assessing the availability of resources will undoubtedly be contested 
terrain. In order for reasonableness review to be an effective tool in 
challenging poverty, it is vital that government's resource allocation de-
cisions are not shielded from scrutiny. A key challenge will be developing 
an appropriate balance between judicial oversight and preserving a rea-
sonable measure of discretion to the legislature and executive in making 
economic poliCY choices. 
The Court has unequivocally established reasonableness review as the 
basiS for enforcing the qualified socio-economic rights in sections 26 and 
27. The detailed criteria provided by the court for a reasonable govern-
ment programme to realise socio-economic rights is likely to prove a 
useful tool, not only in future litigation, but in guiding the adoption, im-
plementation and monitoring of poliCies and legislation. The requirement 
of transparency, recognised in the TAC judgment, will facilitate the moni-
toring of socio-economic rights by civil society and the SAHRC. 
However, by rejecting the concept of minimum core obligations under 
sections 26 and 27, the Court has limited the circumstances in which 
individuals can directly claim socio-economic goods and services from the 
state. It has also been averse to recognising such positive entitlements 
under section 28(l)(c) (children's socio-economic rights)."7 A claim to 
direct relief under the latter provision will only be countenanced when 
children are separated from their families. However, this creates an 
important space for litigation and advocacy aimed at ensuring direct 
access to basiC socio-economic rights by AIDS orphans and child-headed 
households. It wiJl be instructive to observe how the Court approaches the 
interpretation of unqualified socio-economic rights, such as the right to 
basic education in section 29(1)(a),'58 or prisoners' socio-economic rights 
157 In Soobramol1ey. supra note 9, there are indications [hat the scope of s 27(1)(c) (emer· 
gency medical treatmem) is confined to the denial of access to existing faCilities. This 
would be a very narrow interpretation of the right. It remains to be tested whether this 
interpretation will be broadened in future decisions. 
158 The Constitutional Court has affirmed that the right to basic education "creates a positive 
right that basic education be provided for every person and not merely a negative right 
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in section 35(2)(e). If the Court does recognise an individual right to the 
basic services conferred by these sections. there would be little principled 
basis for maintaining its objections to the recognition of minimum core 
obligations under sections 26 and 27. 
The rAe case illustrates that strong organisations will be able to use the 
jurisprudence of reasonableness review to make strategic gains in chal-
lenging social programmes that are not responsive to the needs of the poor. 
However, the Court's rejection of the notion of minimum core obligations 
will make it very difficult for individuals living in extreme poverty to use 
litigation as a strategy to get immediate relief. There is also a danger that 
the state will fail to prioritise the basic socio-economic needs of vulnerable 
groups without the Court affirming this constitutional obligation. 
The only role envisaged by the Court for minimum core obligations is 
pOSSibly as a factor in assessing the reasonableness of government meas-
ures. This does not relieve individuals of the formidable burden of estab-
lishing the unreasonableness of the state's social programmes, nor does it 
entitle them to direct individual relief. Nonetheless it prOVides an impor-
tant opportunity for asserting minimum core obligations as essential 
components of a reasonable government programme. Ideally a failure to 
fulfil minimum core socio-economic rights obligations should render a 
government programme primaJacie unreasonable. 
While the Court has developed clear and useful criteria for a reasonable 
government programme to realise socio-economic rights, it is regrettable 
that it has unnecessarily limited the potential of these constitutional rights 
to contribute to a better quality of liFe For all. 
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